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STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Utah Supreme Couit !„!:; held that, "Trial Courts are given primary
responsibility for making determinations of fact. Findings of tact are reviewed by

find clear error, it must decide that the factual findings made by ..._ .rial court are not
adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light
mo' TavoraD

...

> Inal CUUII'L., delernunction " State ul Utah v. Pena, HW I' I'd

go

The appellate court's standard of review with regard to issues of law are, "that
all applications of law ••• nndings of fact that produce UHIUU.'JIUIIIJ HI Mw ,iu.
reviewed uridyl ,i tu didod i e-nt i. d r.l;--indanl, M

I<M r,rnrectness." State v. Ramirez.

817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991).
In reviewing marshaled evidence, "the appellate court standard ol leview
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it so long as the Court finds that the trial court has exercised its discretion in
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accordance with the standards set by this state's appellate courts." Rudman v.
Rudman. 812 P.2d 73, 79, (Utah App. 1991).
If the appellate court does not have marshaled evidence, "there is no reason
to disturb the trial court's findings." Ashtonv.Ashton. 733 P.2d 147,150(Utah 1987).
Most important for the purposes of this appeal, the Utah Supreme Court outlined in
very detailed fashion in Chen v. Stewart 100 P.3d 1177(Utah 2004), "In order to
challenge a Court's factual findings, an appellant must first marshal all of the
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the findings even when viewed in the light most favorable to
the Court below."
DETERMINATIVE RULES
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9): . . .a party challenging a
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the
request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Court of Appeals should dismiss this appeal due to the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Order supporting the trial record of the several
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contempts entered against the Respondent as well as the Courts' assessment of
attorney fees.
Appellant's lack of marshaling I he evidence w.jn.ml llm, nutlet's suiiiiii.ny
dismissal pinsiinnl In well established caselaw.
STATEMENT OF FACTS/NATURE OF THE CASE
The parties divorced in April, 1999 (Record @ 54). Petitioner filed a Petition
ti i Mi ii III 'in I I in 11 .Mil)'i (I ,i't mil di'i h I I I "i'III n mi I III i 11 in i >nli I In Sin i' i HIM
and a hearing was held on April 4, 2005 (Record @ 85). Petitioner filed a second
Order to Show Cause in September, 2006 (Record @ 167).
At a hearing heiu _ _ L J I M
Kouris to handle the respective Petitions to Modify and the second Order to Show
Cause (Record @ 169) and Respondent was ordered to produce tax records
showing his gross receipts for the past several years.
/'Hi'i i 11 ill 11 11 hi il In 'hi i in Ni loiter °fi '>0()(> II II CHI ill i nloierl respective
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and an Order. Respondent appealed the
Findings and Order entered by the Court, Case No. 20070176, and the Utah Court
of Appeals upheld nil nt Ihr I ri.it ( ourl1'. ImdirKj1; Willi llm exr.eplinir; llinl Ihc 111. il
Court's award of attorney fees to the Petitioner was remanded back to the Trial Court
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for additional findings. Further, the Court of Appeals found that the Trial Court
exceeded its discretion by allowing a letter to be submitted into evidence that was
part of settlement negotiations, but the Utah Court of Appeals also found that the
error was harmless.
ARGUMENT: POINT ONE
WAS THE TRIAL COURT JUSTIFIED IN ITS FINDINGS AND ORDER OF
SEVERAL CONTEMPTS AGAINST THE RESPONDENT?
"The decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court's
action is so unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear
abuse of discretion." Marsh v. Marsh. 1999 UT App 14, 973 P.2d 988 (Utah App.
1999) (quoting Bartholomew v. Bartholomew. 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 1976)).
"Under Utah law, in order to prove contempt for failure to comply with a 'Court
order it must be shown that the person cited for contempt knew what was required,
had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so.'" Homever v.
Staqq & Assocs.. 2006 UT App 89, 132 P.3d 684 (quoting Von Hake v. Thomas.
759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988).
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The Trial Court found that there had been non-compliance by Respondent of
a previous Court order (Record @ 395 and 396). Specifically, paragraph three of
the Decree of Divorce states in part that,... "The parties shall work together to
resolve issues involving the children..." (Record @ 53). The Trial Court specifically
found that... "Respondent was aware of the Decree and certainly had the capacity
to follow the Decree" (Record @ 396). The Court further found that, "Respondent's
actions of calling a family meeting with the children was deplorable for involving the
children of the parties" (Record @ 396).
Petitioner states that a Court order mandating that the parties work together
regarding issues involving the children is the same as giving the parties instructions
that they will not work against one another when dealing with children issues. This
is not to go as far as to say that the parties must be in agreement with each other.
The parties may have genuine disagreements, but the operative words that the
parties "will work together to resolve issues involving the children" means that they
will literallyworktogetherwhen dealing with parenting issues. Of course, the actions
of the Respondent of calling a family meeting without Petitioner being involved and
telling the children:
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1. due to the actions (recent Court litigation) of your Mother the Court
has said that I have not paid your Mother a lot of money;
2. they needed to forgive their mother for the actions she had taken
against Respondent;
3. because of your Mom I can't buy you a big Christmas any more and
I can't take you on vacations and trips any more (Record @ 396).
Respondent would have the Court believe that the Trial Court and Petitioner
argue that there is something inherently wrong with holding a family meeting. Of
course, that is not the case. Respondent is free to hold daily family meetings to
discuss plans and activities of whatever nature Respondent so desires. However,
Respondent is not free to hold family meetings with the children to explain
Respondent's problems with Petitioner or to berate the children's mother and to try
and inform the children that due to actions of the children's mother, the children will
be directly impacted in a huge way.
In fact, Petitioner's testimony at the hearing was that the reaction of the
children immediately after the family meeting, when returning to Petitioner, was that
they were extremely upset and began taking their anger and frustration out on
Petitioner. That is why the Trial Court made very specific findings of fact that
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Respondent's actions "were deplorable" (Record at 396). Additionally, the Trial
Court stated in its findings that the Court was "upset that the Respondent told the
children to forgive their Mother" (Record @ 395).
Further, Respondent's appeal brief defends Respondent's action by stating
that, "the Court does not necessarily police such actions" (Page 20, third full
paragraph). Respondent also claims in the same paragraph that, "An act that may
not be mannerly or inappropriate in a general social setting does not become
contempt because a divorced party is involved" (Respondent's brief at page 20,
paragraph 3).
The second separate contempt found by the Trial Court involved two separate
child support checks from Respondent that had the letter "B" and "B!" handwritten in
the lower left hand corner of each of the checks in the "Memo" or "For" section of the
check. Petitioner submitted copies of the checks in her Affidavit in Support of Order
to Show Cause (Record @ 236 and 237 and Appendix A). Respondent testified that
he did not personally write either of these checks, but that his current wife wrote out
both checks. However, Respondent did testify that he was aware of the checks and
the second check he personally saw what was written on the check and that he
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personally hand delivered the check to one of the minor children to have the child
give the check to Petitioner.
Once again, Respondent tries to down-play and defend his actions claiming
that, "consider the same checks being delivered to a landlord or a creditor. This
action would not be illegal" (Brief at page 20). Not only is Respondent's argument
or justification wrong (individuals have been prosecuted to the full extent of the law
for writing denigrating language on their checks in traffic citation cases and others)
but in both situations of writing denigrating language on checks and in calling family
meetings to discuss what the children's mother has done, the Respondent is putting
the minor children in the middle of the divorce and is telling the children what
Respondent thinks of their Mother. This flies in the face of the Court order that the
parents shall work together for the welfare of the children. This has a literal
poisoning effect upon the children and even reaches issues of abuse and self worth
problems for the children to grapple with.
Taken literally, Respondent would have this Court believe that the only way
that Respondent could be found to be in contempt of Court for non-compliance is if
the language in the Decree prohibited the writing of denigrating language on checks
written by Respondent. Likewise, the argument on the other contempt finding would
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be that the Court could only find contempt if the Court order prohibited any family
meetings. Respondent has not understood Petitioner's position that family meetings
are fine, just not family meetings that discuss what the mother of the children has
done that is wrong and how the children are going to be impacted.
Finally, the Court must consider the cumulative effect that must have been the
mindset of the Trial Court as the evidence unfolded. Less than six months earlier,
October 26, 2006 the Court had held a trial between these exact same parties
regarding different issues. The Court had entered findings (Record @ 210-213) for
contempt against Respondent for:
1. failing to pay the proper amount of child support to Petitioner;
2. failing to pay the proper amount of alimony to Petitioner;
3. failing to produce his tax records; and,
4. failing to pay the necessary non-school extra curricular activities of
the children.
Further, the Court had found that Respondent was not credible in his testimony
and that Petitioner was credible in her trial testimony (Record @ 212).
The cumulative effect of Respondent not complying with numerous Court
orders in the October 26,2006 trial and then the Trial Court finding that Respondent
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was engaging in additional actions that the Court found to be contemptible is best
described by the Court itself at the close of trial on October 26,2006 wherein Judge
Kouris specifically told Respondent, "I'm ordering Mr. Thompson to understand that
today in this courtroom you've been found in contempt of Court. There's a couple
of things that judges can do when people are found in contempt, most notably, they
can put them in jail for a month or they can fine them up to a thousand
dollars....Based on the fact that you knew what all of these requirements are, I
expect you to follow through with them now...the next time that you are found in
contempt of my Court, I will consider seriously jail time (Record @ 352 Trial
transcript, page 158). Finally, it is important to note that the findings of contempt by
the Trial Court were recently upheld by the Utah Court of Appeals in Case No.
20070176CA in a decision recently rendered on January 4, 2008.
ARGUMENT: POINT TWO
DID RESPONDENT PROPERLY MARSHAL ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AS IS
MANDATED BY THE RULES AND THE COURT IN CHEN v. STEWART. 2004 UT
82, 100 P.3D 1177?
Petitioner has already listed under her Standards of Review section of this
brief the problems that are evident due to Respondent's refusal to marshal the
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evidence as is outlined in Chen. Further, Petitioner has set forth the determinative
rule found in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9).
The Utah Supreme Court in Chen not only found that Defendant's had failed
to marshal evidence, the Court also handed down specific "requirements" that
Respondent must meet. An in depth analysis of these requirements brings to light
the serious deficiencies in Respondent's brief. As is stated in Chen. "In order to
challenge a Court's factual findings an appellant must first marshal all the evidence
in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient
to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to a Court
below" (quoting Wilson Supply. Inc. v. Fraden Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, 54 P.3d
1177). The Court admitted in Chen that the requirements to properly marshal were
both rigorous and strict.
The first two issues identified by Respondent in his brief include whether the
Trial Court committed reversible error in finding the Respondent in contempt of
Court. At page ten of Respondent's brief he claims just after the Summary heading
that, "The facts as marshaled to support the District Court's findings are stated
below." Respondent then takes the next three pages of his brief to outline his
marshaled facts. The first two pages of Respondent's attempt to marshal are totally
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irrelevant to the very issues that Respondent raised in the appeal with the exception
that he could argue that the attorney fee issue is impacted. Page twelve and thirteen
under the headings of Family Meeting and Checks with "B!" are the only attempts
that Respondent makes to marshal the facts.
There are precisely seventeen references to the record that Respondent
identifies in his brief on the two issues regarding contempt. The Utah Supreme
Court elaborated in Chen that more recently the Utah Court of Appeals explained
that, "In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very finding that appellant
resists" (quoting Neelv v. Bennett. 2002 UT App 189, 51 P.3d 724).
The Court in Chen gave additional direction to appellants by stating, "This
does not mean that the party may simply provide an exhaustive review of all
evidence presented at trial. Rather, appellants must provide a precisely focused
summary of all the evidence supporting the findings they challenge. This summary
must correlate all particular items of evidence with the challenged findings and then
convince us that the Trial Court erred in the assessment of that evidence to its
findings "(quoting W. Valley City v. Majestic Inv.. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct.
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App. 1991)). "What appellants cannot do is re-argue the factual case they presented
in the Trial Court" (quoting Ondera/SLIC v. Ondera Cold Storage & Warehouse Inc.,
872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct App. 1994).
In its findings the Trial Court outlined the facts that it relied on to enter the
findings of contempt of Court against the Respondent. This included the following
facts that were not addressed by the Respondent:
1. the Decree states that the parties shall work together to solve issues
involving the children;
2. the children are not to be involved;
3. the Respondent had several options available to involve the children;
4. the Respondent was significantly behind in his child support;
5. Respondent told the children to forgive their mother; and,
6. the second check with denigrating language was personally handed
by Respondent to the parties' oldest child (who was 16 years old).
Additionally, the Court in Chen stated, "to properly marshal the evidence the
challenging party must demonstrate how the Court found the facts from the evidence
and then explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of evidence" (citing
Ondera at 1054).
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Here, the Trial Court's findings were clearly supported by the evidence. As
in Chen, Respondent has merely ignored damaging findings and avoided confronting
problematic facts.
Hence, with Respondent not properly marshaling the evidence, the facts as
found by the Trial Court stand and the rulings of contempt are proper or as the Court
stated in Chen, "if the marshaling requirement is not met, the Appellate Court has
grounds to affirm the Court's findings on that basis alone" (quoting Wilson).
ARGUMENT: POINT THREE
DID RESPONDENT CITE AND APPLY THE CORRECT AND PROPER
STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN HIS BRIEF?
In the first two issues as set forth by Respondent in his "Statement of Issues"
he claims that the Standard of Review for contempt cases is clear and convincing
evidence. This claim actually pertains to the burden of proof and not the standard
of review.

The standard of review for a civil contempt finding that is being

challenged is that of "clear abuse of discretion" or are the Trial Court's actions so
unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary. Marsh v. Marsh. 1999
UT App 14, 973 P.2d 988 (quoting Bartholomew v. Bartholomew. 548 P.2d 238,240
(Utah 1976).
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The last two issues raised by Respondent in his appeal deal with attorney
fees. Respondent claims that the standard of review for attorney fees in divorce
cases involves the interpretation of a divorce decree as set forth in Hawkins v. Peart.
2000 Utah 94, 37 P.3d 1062 (Utah 2001). Hawkins is a personal injury contract
indemnity case. The Court held in Hawkins that, "the Supreme Court reviews the
lower Court's contractual interpretation of a release form for correctness, affording
the District Court no deference."
Petitioner sets forth that the standard of review in relation to attorney fees has
nothing to do with a contractual interpretation. If Respondent argues that a divorce
decree is a contract, Petitioner counters that that is incorrect. A marriage may be
an enforceable contract between two individuals but the resulting Decree of Divorce
is not a contract, it is an order of the Court.
Since Respondent has not given the Court of Appeals adequate or correct
standards of review, and since there has not been adequate marshaling of the facts,
Respondent's appeal must fail.
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ARGUMENT: POINT FOUR
HAS RESPONDENT PROPERLY REQUESTED AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF IN THE
ARGUMENT SECTION OF HIS APPEAL BRIEF, POINT SIX, WITHOUT RAISING
OR IDENTIFYING THE REQUEST IN HIS STATEMENT OF ISSUES?
It is not until argument six of Respondent's brief that Respondent claims that
the Court erred in not ordering a refund of the overpaid child support in the amount
of $455.08. Throughout the brief Respondent claims that he prevailed on the
controlling issue of the Order to Show Cause hearing (page 27, second full
paragraph). In fact, this was only one of several issues with a focus by Petitioner on
the improper family meeting and denigrating checks that were being received by
Petitioner from the Respondent.
Respondent should not be allowed to argue that he receive a refund since it
was not properly reserved nor was it properly raised in the brief. The Trial Court was
fully aware of this overpayment yet choose not to order Petitioner to refund it nor
give Respondent credit probably due to the multitude of contempts found by the
Court and the fact that Respondent still owed Petitioner over $50,000.00 that had yet
to be paid.
Petitioner requests that the Court deny this improper request.
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ARGUMENT: POINT FIVE
WAS IT PROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO AWARD PETITIONER HER
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AND DENY RESPONDENT HIS ATTORNEY
FEES?
The Trial Court found that Petitioner was ultimately victorious in her motion in
terms of the contempt. Therefore, her attorney fees and costs were granted (R@
395).
Respondent argues that no attorney fees should be allowed even though the
Decree sets forth an award of fees against a party if they are found in contempt
(Record @46). The Trial Court did not base the award of attorney fees on this
provision in the Decree, but on the fact that Petitioner had prevailed and Respondent
had yet again been found to have demonstrated contemptuous behavior regarding
the orders of the Court.
Further, Respondent argues that he prevailed on the controlling issue of the
hearing, this being whether child support should be raised. Even though the Court
did not enter another contempt of Court against Respondent on this issue, the Court
found that Respondent's actions were upsetting and Respondent's behavior was
deplorable and therefore awarded Petitioner all of her attorney fees and costs.
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ARGUMENT: POINT SIX
PETITIONER SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY FEES
AND COURT COSTS ON APPEAL
The Utah Court of Appeals noted in Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036, 1038
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) that, "An award of attorney fees in divorce actions rests within
the sound discretion of the trial court, which we will not disturb absent an abuse of
discretion." Additionally, the court stated in Childs v. Childs. 967 P.2d 942, 947
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) that, "in divorce proceedings when a trial court has awarded
attorney fees below to the party who then prevails on the main issues on appeal, we
generally award fees on appeal." Petitioner requests that her attorney fees and court
costs be awarded for the necessity of responding to Respondent's appeal and that
a judgment enter against the Respondent.
CONCLUSION
Clearly the Trial Court had an abundant record to determine those issues
outlined in Respondent's brief and Petitioner's response. The Trial Court carefully
weighed the evidence with respect to each of the issues and considered the
testimony of the witnesses at the hearing. Finally, because Respondent did not
marshal the evidence and has not properly identified the Standards of Review,
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Respondent's appeal should be denied and the Trial Court's ruling should be
affirmed. Petitioner should be awarded attorney fees on appeal.
DATED THIS ^

day of January, 2008

^Q
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David J Friel
Attorney for Appellee
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